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ABSTRACT 
Decentralization is expected to lead to greater efficiency in the allocation of public resources, as 
subnational governments are said to have better information than central government about the needs for 
and requirements of public services in their jurisdictions, especially in agricultural and rural areas, where 
information about rural residents’ priorities is more limited. This purported benefit of decentralization 
rests strongly on the assumption that local governments can in fact exercise fiscal discretion to allocate 
resources. However, local government budgets are commonly dominated by intergovernmental and 
external transfers, which are often tied to specific investments, and these at times may not match local 
government priorities. Thus, local governments’ fiscal autonomy may ultimately depend on their ability 
to generate sufficient revenue internally. Panel data on district governments’ public finances in Ghana are 
used to examine the impact of the flow and size of external transfers on districts’ internally generated 
revenues. The evidence suggests that external transfers crowd out local governments’ own revenues, 
which could potentially result in the loss of equity and efficiency gains associated with decentralization. 
This result points to the need for a careful review of Ghana’s fiscal transfer mechanisms in light of the 
central government’s goal of encouraging districts to contribute to rural development through effective 
local public spending and public service provision. 
 
Keywords: decentralization; Ghana; inter-governmental transfers; local government; internally 
generated revenues 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1980s, many countries in Africa have started the process of devolving political, 
administrative, and fiscal responsibilities from central to provincial and local jurisdictions. The 
motivations of countries for undergoing such a governance change are varied and include a range of 
political as well as social and economic factors. Even where political factors have been the main drivers 
in implementing decentralization, strong financial backing from the donor community has usually been 
founded on equity and efficiency arguments. One of these arguments is that subnational governments 
have better information (or can obtain information more cheaply) about the local needs for and 
requirements of public services, and thus a decentralized system will generate greater allocative efficiency 
in public service provision (Hayek 1945). Additional theoretical outcomes said to result in improved 
public service provision in a politically and fiscally decentralized system include greater political 
competition at the local level, leading to more accountable local governments (Crook and Manor 1998), 
and greater jurisdictional competition arising from citizens choosing their location on the basis of the 
quality of services (Tiebout 1956). 
These and other arguments rest strongly on the assumption that the fiscal aspect of 
decentralization in fact results in local governments gaining substantial discretion in allocating public 
resources to competing economic uses in their jurisdictions. This assumption is germane to the realization 
of the benefits from decentralization discussed above, since these benefits are all predicated on the notion 
of local governments as capable decisionmakers, able to act upon information and upon the pressures of 
political and jurisdictional competition. The empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization of 
governance shows that many aspects of decentralization (including management of local service provision 
by local authorities and representation of disadvantaged groups in local government) have had positive 
impacts on several measures of development, including service delivery outcomes, corruption, 
accountability, and local business development (see review by Bardhan [2002]). Other studies also show 
negative association between fiscal decentralization and local economic growth (e.g., Zhang and Zou 
1996). In general, decentralization can lead to less efficient or less equitable allocation of 
resources due to elite capture, fiscal disparities, social unrest, and weak local government 
capacity, among other reasons (see, for example, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Prud’homme 
1996; Alemán and Treisman 2005). 
In practice, in many developing countries—as in the case of Ghana, which this paper focuses 
on—local fiscal discretion may be very restricted in the sense that local authorities may have relatively 
little control even over their own budgets. A substantial share of their revenues is often made up of 
transfers from upper tiers of government or from donors, and these funds tend to be formally or 
informally tied to particular activities, projects, or sectors (see, for example, Crook 2003; Ghana 2007; 
Kokor and Kroës 2000; ISODEC 2005). Revenues that local governments generate themselves, through 
the tax and fee bases assigned to them, can, in contrast, be used in a completely flexible manner. In this 
sense, local governments’ fiscal autonomy is intimately tied to their ability to generate own resources. 
Therefore, an important part of the policy debate around decentralization concerns the question of 
how local governments can expand their fiscal autonomy by increasing their internally generated funds 
(IGF) and realize the hypothesized equity and efficiency gains in the local provision of public services. In 
Ghana, there are a range of potential constraints affecting the ability of district assemblies—the term for 
Ghana’s district-level governing bodies—to expand their IGF. These include incentives that are explicit 
or implicit in the pattern of intergovernmental and donor transfers, the scope of local governments’ 
revenue assignments, revenue collection capacity, discretion in setting rates on their tax and fee bases, 
and enforcement of honest revenue-collection practices. 
This paper focuses on the first aspect of the potential constraints to expanding IGF, by 
investigating what impact the flow and size of grants (i.e., central government and donor funds) have had 
on the incentives of local governments to generate own revenues. With grants comprising the bulk of 
local governments’ total revenues, the incentive effect that grants have on local governments’ own 2 
revenues is a critical policy concern in Ghana. The recent Decentralization Policy Review, conducted 
jointly by the government and donors in Ghana to inform the development of a new decentralization 
policy by the cabinet, states that  
although the DACF [District Assemblies Common Fund] formulae contains [sic] a small incentive to 
improve on IGF (very small criteria weight for the so-called ‘responsiveness’ factor), this is not 
perceived sufficient to promote improvements in the MMDA [Metropolitan, Municipal, and District 
Assembly] revenue mobilisation. As indicated in a report from 2000, the incentives to collect 
revenues may be impacted negatively by the increase in grants. Further studies of this and of the real 
MMDA revenue potential within the existing legal framework is urgently required. (Ghana 2007) 
Research on the crowding effects of IGF by grants is important in at least two ways with regard to 
how grants, and local revenue generation, may be improved to minimize any negative impacts. 
Crowding out of IGF by grants will result in the loss of equity and efficiency gains in the local 
provision of public services to the extent that IGF and grants are not substitutable in terms of local 
priorities, ceteris paribus. Then, local participation in all stages of external project design, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, for example, would help match the priorities of external 
funders with local priorities. Even if IGF and grants are substitutable, there can still be erosion of gains 
to the extent that the unit costs of raising and accounting for IGF and grants differ. In this case, 
finding ways to reduce costs will be important. 
In the next section, we present our conceptual framework and a review of the empirical literature 
on how external grants, as well as other factors, may affect local revenues. This is followed in Section 3 
by an outline of the policy and empirical context for this study, and a discussion of district governments’ 
revenue structure and degree of fiscal autonomy. Section 4 describes the empirical model for determining 
the effect intergovernmental and external transfers have on districts’ incentives for generating own 




2.  DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE GENERATION 
Whether motivated by policy concerns with regard to how local government fiscal behavior contributes to 
evolving decentralization, by the benefit incidence of local taxes, or by other factors, the literature has 
taken an interest in the question of how local tax-generation efforts and revenues respond to 
intergovernmental transfers. Nearly all quantitative empirical research on this topic, however, involves 
developed economies, likely due in large part to the scarcity of data on local public finance in developing 
countries (an “issues” piece for the developing-country context is offered by Bird and Smart [2002]). 
A common conceptual foundation for the pathway through which external grants affect local 
revenues is the median-voter model. Applied in this context, the hypothesis is essentially that grants from 
upper-tier governments crowd out revenues from local taxes. Assuming an initial optimal balance 
between local public consumption and private consumption, grants would be passed on to local residents 
as reductions in local taxes and fees, other factors remaining unchanged (Bradford and Oates 1971).  
Several studies using data from developed countries have empirically tested this hypothesis 
without necessarily explicitly using a median-voter model or laying out the conceptual foundation for 
how grants may trigger local fiscal behavior. For example, Zhuravskaya (2000) establishes such a 
crowding-out effect in Russia, where each monetary unit raised in own revenues by a local government is 
offset by 0.9 units in revenue sources from the higher-tier government, which strongly implies that local 
governments will have nearly no incentive to exert any tax-generating effort when transfers increase. 
Wildasin (1984) theoretically examines the pathway of impact of different types of intergovernmental 
transfers (matching grants versus lump-sum grants) on local taxes. 
Buettner and Wildasin (2006) take an integrated approach in which all interrelationships between 
various local public finance variables—general expenditure, debt service expenditure, intergovernmental 
grants, and own revenues—are assessed, with minimal imposition of structure on the empirical model. 
They find that in the United States the adjustment of local governments to an increase in external grants 
results in reduced subsequent own-revenue generation—a finding broadly consistent with the above 
hypothesis. In a similarly empirically oriented study, Dahlberg et al. (2007), who focused on 
econometrically addressing the potential endogeneity of grants, find neither a crowding-in nor a 
crowding-out effect of intergovernmental transfers on local tax rates, nor on local tax revenues. One of 
the few studies that refutes the above hypothesis and identifies a positive (crowding-in) effect of higher-
tier government aid to local governments on locally generated revenues is the study by Skidmore (1999) 
on U.S. state and local governments, in which the grants are a control variable and the central issue is the 
effectiveness of statutory revenue and expenditure limitations in reining in local government size.  
Local revenues can also be affected by several factors other than intergovernmental grants. These 
include other fiscal variables, political economy factors, and other factors that may affect the tax revenue 
base and the capacity to collect taxes, such as the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the 
jurisdiction of the local government. Regarding the influence of other fiscal factors, Skidmore (1999) and 
Dye and McGuire (1997) consider how effective an Illinois tax limitation measure was in controlling 
municipality property taxes. Another important fiscal factor is local expenditures. Using a vector 
autoregression model on U.S. municipal governments, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1989) tackle this 
question by concurrently thinking through the causality and the time-sequence nature of these two 
variables. De Mello (2002) seeks to measure the effect of local public spending in Brazil on economic 
growth, by proxying the latter by local per capita tax revenue. Another fiscal policy driver of local own-
source revenue that has also been studied is federal deductibility of local taxes (Holtz-Eakin 1992). 
Political economy determinants of locally generated revenues have been the subject of much 
empirical research, again almost exclusively involving industrialized countries. Partisan politics, and the 
political structure of local government, is considered to be a potentially important influence on local tax 
and revenue generation. For example, Allers, de Haan, and Sterks (2001) in the case of the Netherlands, 
and Borge and Rattsø (1997) in the Norwegian context, establish that the political ideology of government 
influences the level of local taxation: the more left-leaning the government, the more taxation. However, 4 
the studies’ findings diverge with regard to the effect of government structure: Larger coalition 
governments (as opposed to smaller coalitions or one-party governments) are associated with lower 
taxation in the Dutch context, but with higher tax revenues in the Norwegian case. Solé-Ollé (2006) 
combines government ideology with the degree of competitiveness of elections to examine hypotheses 
from two alternative models in the empirical context of Spain. According to the Leviathan hypothesis, 
governments that face lower levels of competition are more likely to expand government size and extract 
higher taxes, irrespective of the government’s ideological makeup, while the partisanship model proposes 
that less competition results in higher (lower) tax revenues if the government is more left (right) wing, as 
less competition implies that the government is less compelled to trade off its own preferences against 
those of the median voter (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Boyne 1994). 
Natural, socioeconomic, and demographic factors in the jurisdiction of the local government are 
additional potential determinants of locally generated revenues, especially factors that determine the tax 
revenue base and the capacity of the local government to collect taxes. Although tax rates and revenue-
generation assignments are likely to be the same across different jurisdictions, differences in the above 
factors will have different effects on the amounts of revenue generated by local governments. For 
example, jurisdictions with larger deposits of natural resources are more likely to generate greater local 
revenues through royalties from mining or extraction of the natural resources. The same is likely to apply 
to jurisdictions with greater nonfarm economic activity and more private residences, through more 
collection of business license fees, which are mostly levied on firms, and of property taxes, which are 
levied on private residences. As local residents may to some extent have a say in the level and variety of 
taxes instituted, the social composition of the jurisdiction along ethnic, religious, or other social lines is 
another potential factor, although the direction of impact on local revenue generation is ambiguous and 
likely highly context-specific. 
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3.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
The analysis draws mainly on three sources of data. At the core is a relatively long panel of data on 
Ghanaian local governments’ public finances, obtained from the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
Development, and Environment (MLGRDE). Districts’ revenues are available disaggregated by source 
(revenues from licenses, property taxes, external grants, etc.), and districts’ expenditures are 
disaggregated by economic classification (expenditures on personnel, travel and transport, capital, etc.). 
The panel spans 11 years (1994–2004) and covers all of Ghana’s 110 districts existent at the time of the 
study.
1
The other two main sources of data are Ghana’s 2003 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
(CWIQ) survey and the 2000 Population and Housing Census, which are used primarily to identify 
district socioeconomic and demographic variables. The CWIQ has a sample size of over 49,000 
households and the data are representative at the district level, enabling aggregation of household 
information to the district level. The Population and Housing Census data, which are representative below 
the district level, also allow aggregation to the district level. In addition to data from these three primary 
sources, this paper also draws on data on central government aggregate public expenditure accounts from 
Ghana’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Controller and Accountant General’s 
Department; data on the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), which were obtained from the 
DACF Administrator’s Office; and district-level rainfall data from the Meteorological Services 
Department. 
  
Locally generated revenues make up only a small, but not negligible, fraction of district 
assemblies’ (DAs’) total sources of funds. On average, they constituted 16 percent of total district 
government revenues over the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This share has not been 
uniform over time, and the direction of change is surprising. There has been a gradual decline in the IGF 
component over a decade, from 46 percent in 1994 to 10 percent in 2004. This is not what one would 
expect in light of consistent, albeit only partially successful, efforts to deepen decentralization in Ghana, 
including efforts to strengthen the fiscal position of district governments.  
In the initial period of Figure 1 (i.e., 1994), internal revenue sources were nearly equal to external 
funds. This is a feature of the fact that the DACF, which is the main vehicle for intergovernmental 
transfers, commenced in 1994, and although the constitution stipulated that 5 percent of central 
government revenues be allocated to the districts in the form of the DACF, it is likely that the financial 
management infrastructure to disburse the DACF was not yet fully in place in its first year.  
                                                       
1 After 2004 an additional 28 districts were created by splitting some larger districts, and further splits in 2007 resulted in the 
current 168 districts. 6 
Figure 1. Components of districts’ revenue: internally generated funds (IGF) and external funds  
 
Figure 1 suggests how trends in external and internal revenue sources contributed to the decline 
in the share of IGF. As the lines (which are measured along the right axis) show, IGF over time was 
nearly flat, while external funds grew precipitously, especially in 1995 and then again in more recent 
years. The regional trends of IGF and external transfers, interestingly, closely mirror their aggregate in 
Figure 1. Per capita IGF is low and flat over time in nearly all regions, and the flow of transfers takes on a 
trend of rapid increase in the first year and the last few years (see figures in the Appendix). 
The relatively low growth in internal revenues and higher growth in external sources of funds for 
district governments is somewhat suggestive of the greater ease with which transfers and donor resources 
can be used to increase district governments’ budgets, compared to seeking to achieve this goal by 
incentivizing and strengthening the capacity of DAs to generate more own revenues. In fact, it is mostly 
in more recent periods that there has been greater policy attention to the low level and stagnation of IGF, 
as opposed to a sole focus on increasing external transfers to DAs as a means of deepening fiscal 
decentralization. 
As Figure 2 shows, in per capita and absolute terms, the magnitude of average local government-
generated revenue is quite small. On average, local governments collect 65,000 GHC of their own 
revenues annually.
2
                                                       
2 1 GHC (Ghanaian cedi) was approximately equivalent to US$0.69 in 2009. 
 In all years in the decade of study, the regional averages of districts’ IGF are all under 
approximately 250,000 GHC. The exceptions are the districts in the Greater Accra region—the highest-
income region, dominated by Ghana’s capital, Accra—which generate about 5 to 10 times the local 
revenues of districts in other regions. In per capita terms, IGF amounts to 0.29 GHC per person in the 
average district. As discussed above, this has not changed substantially over time. IGF increased by less 
than half, from 0.27 GHC in 1994 to 0.40 GHC a decade later. 7 
Figure 2. Absolute and per capita amount of districts’ internally generated revenues (1994–2004 
average, real GHC) 
 
District governments have seven key sources for generating own revenues: property taxes; a head 
tax levied in a fixed amount from each district resident; royalties from natural resources such as timber 
and minerals; a range of fees and tolls, such as those charged on market stalls; business licensing; returns 
from financial investments (e.g., dividends and interest rate earnings on financial capital); and rent 
collected on DA-owned properties. In contrast, central government has control over all income taxes. 
As seen in the top panel of Figure 3, local governments’ revenue portfolio has generally not 
changed substantially over time, and is, in the aggregate, relatively diversified.  
 8 
Figure 3. Components of internally generated funds  
Ghana-wide: 




   
Still, there are some sources that tend to predominate on average, such as fees (e.g., market stall 
user fees and parking tolls) and property taxes. Business licenses and permits, and royalties on natural 
resources, generate a somewhat smaller portion of revenues. Revenue from financial capital, and from 
rents collected on buildings owned by the DAs, play only a minor role in generating revenue. However, 
the nationwide relative diversity of local revenue portfolios hides the stronger concentrations visible at the 
regional levels. The bottom panel of Figure 3 uses the example of three regions in which one revenue 
source constitutes over one-third of the districts’ IGF, with the dominant source differing across these 
regions. For example, the Western region, which is very rich in timber and mining resources, relies on 
royalties from natural resources to generate 44% of local revenues (well above the national average of 
15%). 
The effectiveness of the incentives explicit or implicit in central government and donor grants 
depends not only on the strength of these incentives but also on the extent to which there is potential to 
increase internal revenues. Three factors play a role in this potential: first, the extent to which, given the 
revenue assignments, DAs have discretion in setting rates for taxes and fees; second, the extent to which 
the revenue-collection effort is constrained by administrative capacity and internal incentives (e.g., 
compensation design to improve local tax officials’ efforts and prevent leakages); and finally, the extent 
to which extending tax and fee collection either through greater efficiency or higher tax and fee rates 
encounters the resistance of residents.  
The discretion to set tax rates and fees on DAs’ revenue bases is reasonably large: With the 
exception of royalties, for which the central government determines the rates, DAs are permitted to 
establish the rates and fees on all other revenue sources assigned to them, albeit given ceilings set by 9 
central government (primarily through the MLGRDE).
3
Local fiscal autonomy is typically associated with the size of local governments’ budgets. That is, 
the larger (relative to total public spending) the local governments’ expenditures, the more one can speak 
of local fiscal autonomy. While this is true in Ghana as well, in this country’s context the issue of fiscal 
autonomy is, given the prevailing fiscal constellation, just as intimately tied to the relative size of 
internally generated revenues in districts’ revenue portfolios. Nearly all transfers as well as donor 
finances that are channeled to district governments are more or less narrowly tied to specific types of 
expenditures or to the implementation of projects. The one revenue source over which districts exercise 
full discretion—subject, naturally, to limitations arising from specific local expenditure assignments—is 
internally generated revenues. Therefore, the capacity, legal framework, and incentives that govern own-
revenue generation also determine the extent of local governments’ fiscal autonomy. 
 However, even these ceilings have de facto not 
always been treated as binding: Given that the current ceilings have for the most part not been 
recalculated for over a decade, there are several instances in which DAs have in practice exceeded them. 
While autonomy in rate setting is thus not a binding constraint to the potential impact of external 
incentives for increasing revenues, DA capacity to tap into certain revenue sources does constitute a 
limitation, especially at the level of the revenue collectors. Ghana (2007) even suggests that the districts’ 
revenue-mobilization capacity is one of the weakest among the various aspects of local financial 
management. Finally, political resistance to local tax increases is likely to be an issue in Ghana, where 
local revenue assignments make IGF a relatively visible form of tax, in contrast to income taxes deducted 
at the source. Such resistance, combined with the fact that the local nature of the spending of these 
revenues creates greater transparency about the quality of these expenditures, may, however, contribute to 
more judicious use of these public resources, even where it will likely pose a constraint on the size of 
local revenues (ISODEC 2004). 
As Figure 1 showed, local governments rely heavily on central government and external funds, as 
is common in nearly all decentralized countries in Africa. An important component of these funds is the 
DACF, which makes up slightly more than half of all external sources of revenue. Intergovernmental 
transfers also include “ceded revenues,” which are revenues collected by the central tax agency on behalf 
of DAs. The transfer of ceded revenues, terminated in 2005, was a more important source of funding in 
the early years of decentralization, especially before the institution of the DACF. After the introduction of 
the DACF, ceded revenues played a smaller role in local governments’ budgets, and their disbursement 
was often unreliable in timing and magnitude (Ghana 2007).  
A more recently instituted (and by 2006 ended) grant is the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) fund, commenced in 2002 and allocated both to central government ministries as well as to DAs. 
As Table 1 shows, it constitutes a nonnegligible share of DAs’ revenue. The HIPC funds to the districts 
have allocation criteria, earmarks, and reporting formats that are distinct from those of other sources. 
There is a lack of clarity on the allocation criteria, however, and therefore it is not clear whether there are 
explicit incentive mechanisms for districts to develop own sources of revenue.  
Donors also have district-specific projects, the funds for which they either channel through the 
DAs’ budgets or maintain off budget. Several districts may not have donor projects for which the funds 
go through the DAs, but for those that do, donor funds can be a substantial share of revenues. Table 1 
captures only such on-budget district donor funds, as data are not available for off-budget external aid to 
districts. 
                                                       
3 While DAs can set property tax rates, the revaluation of taxable properties—proper implementation of which would be 
likely to increase property taxes accruing to DAs—is undertaken by the Land Valuation Board, which is not under the control of 
the DAs and itself lacks the capacity to execute this task. 10 
Table 1. Average district revenue in 2004, by revenue source 
Region 
External sources (% of total)     Internal (% 










IGF  Salary 
transfers  HIPC  DACF   
Ashanti   7.6  18.8  38.4  19.5  84.3   15.7  653,975 
Brong Ahafo  13.1  21.6  47.1  7.5  89.3   10.7  471,750 
Central  8.1  27.7  50.4  6.0  92.2   7.8  491,149 
Eastern  11.1  17.9  51.3  6.2  86.5   13.5  365,634 
Greater Accra  11.1  18.1  20.9  0.7  50.9   49.1  1,604,321 
Northern  5.1  20.0  65.7  6.5  97.2   2.8  600,811 
Upper East  6.6  15.6  41.9  27.7  91.8   8.2  591,765 
Upper West  3.3  30.9  36.9  22.8  93.9   6.1  759,999 
Volta  6.7  34.3  44.9  6.3  92.1   7.9  489,934 
Western  6.8  26.9  41.6  2.1  77.4   22.6  633,756 
Ghana  8.1  22.6  43.5  9.8  84.0    16.0  593,781 
Notes:  
DACF = District Assemblies Common Fund; HIPC = Highly Indebted Poor Countries; IGF = internally generated funds 
*While HIPC funds also originate from donor resources, they are disseminated by the central government and thus here reported 
separately from other donor funds. This category refers to resources from donors going directly to districts. 
Despite the attention in the fiscal decentralization policy debate that is given to increasing local 
fiscal autonomy, the framework for the allocation of intergovernmental transfers and donor funds to the 
DAs gives only very limited consideration to incentives for own-revenue generation. The DACF is the 
only outside revenue source that has a built-in incentive scheme, through the formula for its allocation to 
districts. The allocation formula gives weight to four criteria: (a) equity across districts, which refers 
simply to a base sum distributed in equal amounts to each district; (b) population density; (c) service 
pressure, relying mostly on the number of existing facilities and service providers in the education and 
health sectors; and (d) own-revenue generation. In the weighting scheme for these four criteria, the last 
criterion receives only 3–5 percent weight for most of the years, as can be seen in Table 2.
4
                                                       
4 The allocation formula is set by the DACF administrator and then annually ratified by parliament, and therefore changes 
slightly from year to year.  
 Thus, the 
incentive component of the DACF is very weak and appears a priori unlikely, on its own, to have much 
potential for substantial impact. 11 
Table 2. Formula weights for criteria for District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) allocation 
(%) 
Criterion  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Equity  30  30  30  30  35  35  35  35  35  35  60  60  50  50 
Population 
density 
15  15  15  15  10  10  10  10  10  5  3  2  5  5 
Service 
pressure 
35  35  35  35  35  35  40  40  50  55  35  35  40  40 
Own-revenue 
generation 
20  20  20  20  20  20  15  15  5  5  2  3  5  5 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: DACF, various years; Banful (2008). 12 
4.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The long panel dataset on local governments’ finances in Ghana permits us to assess empirically the 
extent to which revenues received externally have spurred or disincentivized local governments’ internal 
revenue generation, with internal revenues being nearly the sole source of fully discretionary expenditures 
by districts. 
Financial and Nonfinancial Determinants of Districts’ Own Revenues 
The first model examines the drivers of the magnitude, or level, of IGF, which is hypothesized to be 
affected by both public financial variables and core district characteristics: 
    (1) 
EXTit-1 represents lagged external (central government and donor) transfers to local governments. 
The expenditure vector EXPit-1 consists of different types of past expenditures of local governments. The 
vector xi is made up of basic economic, demographic, social, and climatic characteristics of district i (and 
includes unity). Specifically, economic features, reflecting economic welfare and development, are the 
district poverty rate, the literacy rate, and average access to roads by households in the district; 
demographic district attributes include the degree of urbanization and population size and density; 
variables defined as the shares of Ghana’s two largest ethnic groups (Akan and Ewe) and Christians in the 
district represent core social characteristics; and climatic conditions are measured by district rainfall. The 
region dummies Ri control for region-specific effects. Finally, the composite error term ηi + εit consists of 
a district unobserved effect and an idiosyncratic disturbance (see Table 3 for a more detailed description 
of the variables and their summary statistics). 
In including the district characteristics, we are also accounting for the factors—not the central 
question in this study, but important to take into account—that may influence the size of district IGF 
through mechanisms other than the incentive effects of external grants and transfers. These mechanisms 
were discussed in Section 2. For example, local governments’ tax and fee bases define an approximate 
upper bound to how much revenue they can collect. The tax bases in turn are strongly determined by the 
income levels of the district population, and by district governments’ revenue assignments. While data are 
not available on income levels, districts’ poverty levels, included in the model, offer a rough proxy to this. 
Revenue assignments are naturally the same across districts. But districts with different attributes will 
have narrower or more expanded tax and fee bases, for the given (universal) revenue assignments. For 
example, licenses, which are mostly levied on businesses, and property taxes, which are levied on private 
residences, are predominantly generated in urban areas. Because the extent of urbanization of a district is 
thus strongly correlated with the relative importance of these revenue sources in the overall IGF portfolio, 
inclusion of urbanization in the model reflects this dimension of revenue assignments. 
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Table 3. Variable definition and district-average descriptives 
Variable  Description  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Socioeconomic and physical district characteristics
a     
sh. urban  Proportion of urban residents  0.30  0.22 
pop. density  Persons per km
2 land area
  155.61  391.84 
pop. size  Population size in 1,000s  171.93  188.76 
poverty   Headcount poverty rate
b  0.47  0.17 
rain   Long-term annual rainfall, in mm  1304.81  225.83 
no road  Share of households with road not / not easily accessible all year 
round  0.19  0.16 
literacy  Literacy rate  0.50  0.19 
Christian  Share of Christian residents  0.66  0.24 
ethn. Akan  Share belonging to the Akan ethnic group  0.47  0.35 
ethn. Ewe  Share belonging to the Ewe ethnic group  0.13  0.23 
R  Vector of region dummies     
Local public finance variables (all in per capita form, constant 2000 values, GHC * 10,000)
c 
REV  Vector of revenue components     
IGF  Internally generated funds     
EXT  Revenues from external sources (central government and donors) 
EXP  Vector of expenditure components     
Personnel-E  Personnel expenditure     
Recurrent-E  Nonpersonnel recurrent expenditure     
Capital-E  Capital expenditure     
Notes: 
a Unweighted averages across districts. 
b Based on data from the 2003 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire and the 2000 
Population and Housing Census, drawn from Coulombe (2005). 
c Detailed descriptives on local public finance variables are in 
Table 1 and Appendix Table A.1. 
The vector of public expenditure variables, EXPit-1, consists of an economic decomposition of 
local government spending into personnel, nonpersonnel recurrent, and capital expenditures. This 
decomposition has an a priori rationale: While internally generated revenue in Ghana’s districts for the 
most part can be spent at the discretion of local governments, it is more often than not used to cover 
maintenance and other (nonpersonnel) recurrent costs. Since the DACF, an important part of 
intergovernmental transfers, is supposed to be used primarily for capital investment spending, IGF is 
frequently not allocated for capital investments, in order to maintain a desirable balance between capital 
and recurrent expenditures. Some share of salaries is paid through IGF. But as the administrative 
dimension is perhaps the least complete of the three dimensions of decentralization in Ghana, most civil 
servants, including those operating at the district level, are still under the management of and 
compensated through the budget of the central government. This places a check on the extent to which 
district government revenues, especially IGF, are used for salary expenditures. All this suggests that 
changes in different types of expenditures may be likely to exert quite different influences on subsequent 
efforts in local own-revenue generation, and that this differentiation in influence should be accommodated 
in the empirical model. 
We estimate equation (1)—and variations of it in terms of specification and measurement of the 
dependent variable—using as the primary method the Hausman-Taylor estimation (Hausman and Taylor 
1981). This approach addresses limitations that would arise with both random-effects and fixed-effects 
estimations in the context of this model. Within-group estimation is not able to identify the time-invariant 
variable xi, which, while not central to the core research question of this paper, is nevertheless of interest. 
Random-effects models, in contrast, assume that all covariates are uncorrelated with the unobserved 14 
effect ηi, which, if false, leads to inconsistent estimates, and such orthogonality is a stronger assumption 
than we are willing to impose. In particular, one should be concerned that the overall amount of external 
grants and transfers local governments are able to attract may plausibly be influenced by a range of 
district (and district leadership) features that we are not able to capture in our model. This is likely to 
include a district’s political history, especially features that contribute to political connectedness with the 
central government, as well as the ability and capacity of local governments to draw resources from 
donors and other sources. We therefore treat the magnitude of external grants and transfers as endogenous 
in the model, in the sense that it may be correlated with district unobserved effects. 
The Hausman-Taylor estimation approach builds on the within-estimators of the time-varying 
variables, and uses those (included) time-varying and time-fixed variables that are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the unobserved effect to instrument for those variables that are potentially correlated 
with the district effect. The Hausman-Taylor estimates will be compared with those estimates that use the 
methods the Hausman-Taylor estimation is partially built on—random effects and fixed effects—as well 
as with pooled ordinary least squares, by way of gaining additional insights into how the respective 
underlying assumptions of the different methods affect the key results. 
Local Financial Dynamics and Growth in Own Revenues 
The model in equation (1) examines the drivers of the levels of per capita own revenue. This is a useful 
exercise in that it gives first insights into what may be the core determinants of the extent of a district’s 
fiscal autonomy, which is well approximated by the magnitude of IGF. This empirical endeavor, however, 
also has some limitations, of both a substantive and a technical nature. First, the level or magnitude of 
own revenues may feed back to affect districts’ economic performance, and thus poverty. This concern in 
fact does not weigh too heavily, in light of the fact that own revenues are still small relative to districts’ 
overall budgets, and in turn districts’ budgets are small relative to the total government spending affecting 
a given district. Furthermore, any causal line from a district’s overall economic performance to district 
poverty levels can be complex and is not straightforwardly given. Still, the level estimation is saddled 
with this (albeit mild) endogeneity concern. 
Another source of endogeneity to be concerned about, which the model in equation (1) may have 
mitigated but may fail to eliminate, is that the association between local public spending categories and 
IGF may be at least in part driven by a budget-size effect: Districts with larger budgets spend more, and 
budgets are larger when one of the revenue sources (e.g., IGF) is larger, all else being equal. This possible 
element of simultaneity bias is mitigated in the level equation (1) by using the levels of past, rather than 
contemporaneous, expenditures as regressors. However, the use of lags in this fashion is usually an 
incomplete answer to simultaneity bias. Using changes, rather than levels, in the dependent variable deals 
with this potential endogeneity. 
Finally, IGF levels—as opposed to changes in IGF—rely overly on district fixed (or slow-
moving) attributes, besides local financial variables. Generally, poorer districts, districts with less 
administrative government capacity, and so on are conceivably able to generate less own revenue per 
capita than their more developed counterparts, and these effects may be quite strong relative to the effects 
emanating from financial variables, such as higher or lower intergovernmental grants. In other words, a 
better way to ascertain the influence of external grants on internal revenue generation is to consider how 
changes in IGF are affected by revenues from external sources. While the level of a given district’s per 
capita IGF is expected to depend importantly on its nonfinancial attributes, as illustrated above, the 
growth rate of IGF is less obviously reliant on such factors, and we can concentrate our analysis on local 
public financial factors. Also, in econometric terms, this frees us to apply estimation methods that are 
appropriate for the case at hand but that are not able to estimate time-invariant factors. 
The model of IGF growth is then: 
    (2) 15 
We allow here for both changes and levels of financial variables to determine IGF growth. With 
respect to the variable of interest, this implies that we are testing whether districts with higher levels of 
per capita external transfers and grants experience higher (or lower) IGF growth, and also whether past 
increases in external grants (for a given magnitude of per capita grants) have an IGF-growth boosting or 
dampening effect.  
This model also permits examination of the way different districts’ locally generated revenues 
evolve relative to each other. Specifically, the parameter on the lagged level of local revenues speaks to 
the nature of convergence (or divergence) of districts’ local revenues over time. This specification also 
introduces a dynamic component, since the variable vector Δ ln(REVit-1) includes Δ ln(IGFit-1). We thus 
estimate the model (for those specifications including the lagged dependent variable) using the Arellano-
Bond (1991) and the Arellano-Bover (1995) / Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic estimators. The latter 
estimator has an advantage over the former in terms of the finite sample means and asymptotic efficiency 
of the estimator for the lagged dependent variable’s parameter, in cases where the true (absolute) value of 
the parameter is relatively large and the time-series in the panel relatively small. A comparison between 
the results from these two estimators—as well as other estimators suitable in the case of variations on the 
model specification—will be presented and results discussed in this light.  
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5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Determinants of the Magnitude of IGF 
Prior to examining the role of financial transfers and other local government financial factors on districts’ 
own-revenue generation, we first take a look at the relationship between own revenues and core district 
physical, social, and economic characteristics (Table 4).  
Table 4. Internally generated funds and district characteristics
† 
  Ordinary least squares    Random effects 
Dependent variable:  Single-year  3-year average    Single-year  3-year average 
sh. urban  0.5093 
*  0.4887 
*    0.4002 
**  0.3804 
* 
  (0.2739)    (0.2649)     (0.199)    (0.2075) 
  
ln(pop. density)  –0.1027   0.0413     0.0515   0.0606   
  (0.0623)    (0.0603)     (0.0453)    (0.0472) 
  
ln(pop. size)  –0.2518 
**  –0.1715 
*    –0.192 
***  –0.1944 
** 
  (0.1028)    (0.0995)     (0.0747)    (0.0779) 
  
poverty  –2.1748 
***  –2.2644 
***    –1.9168 
***  –1.9865 
*** 
  (0.5215)    (0.5044)     (0.379)    (0.3951) 
  
ln(rain)  –0.1522   0.3165     0.3221   0.3746   
  (0.5096)    (0.4929)     (0.3696)    (0.3861) 
  
no road   0.3208   –0.2517     –0.1678   –0.212   
  (0.326)    (0.3153)     (0.2368)    (0.247) 
  
literacy  2.183 
***  1.027     0.5805   0.4631   
  (0.8133)    (0.7867)     (0.5914)    (0.6162) 
  
Christian  –1.4002 
**  –0.839     –0.6868 
*  –0.5968   
  (0.5492)    (0.5312)     (0.4002)    (0.4161) 
  
ethn. Akan  0.0089   –0.3364     –0.0913   –0.0633   
  (0.3248)    (0.3142)     (0.2357)    (0.2461) 
  
ethn. Ewe  –0.009   0.1712     0.2014   0.3485   
  (0.4184)    (0.4047)     (0.3033)    (0.317) 
  
Western R.  1.2883 
***  0.7599 
**    0.6872 
***  0.5739 
** 
  (0.3667)    (0.3547)     (0.2671)    (0.2778) 
  
Central R.  0.5439   0.1265     0.3847   0.2927   
  (0.3395)    (0.3284)     (0.2473)    (0.2572) 
  
Greater Accra R.  1.3732 
***  0.6922 
*    1.2094 
***  1.1106 
*** 
  (0.3786)    (0.3662)     (0.2756)    (0.2868) 
  
Volta R.  0.5296   –0.0082     0.2899   0.1639   
  (0.3379)    (0.3268)     (0.2454)    (0.256) 
  
Eastern R.  0.5648 
*  0.0814     0.3211   0.2019   
  (0.3254)    (0.3147)     (0.2369)    (0.2465) 
  
Ashanti R.  0.813 
**  0.3785     0.4871 
**  0.3863   
  (0.3213)    (0.3107)     (0.2341)    (0.2434) 
  
Brong Ahafo R.  0.5958 
*  0.5066 
*    0.7236 
***  0.6508 
*** 
  (0.3083)    (0.2982)     (0.225)    (0.2336) 
  
Upper East R.  1.1505 
***  0.7054 
***    0.9607 
***  0.9708 
*** 
  (0.2327)    (0.2251)     (0.1692)    (0.1763) 
  
Upper West R.  1.5737 
***  1.0166 
***    0.9848 
***  0.9981 
*** 
  (0.2485)    (0.2403)     (0.1812)    (0.1883) 
  
Constant  10.7305 
***  7.1681 
**    6.6042 
**  6.3009 
** 
  (3.6463) 
   (3.5266) 
    (2.6442) 
   (2.7625) 
  
Adj. R
2:  0.69 
  0.63  Breusch-Pagan (χ
2)  284.81 
***  601.14 
*** 
Notes: 
Number of observations: 110. 
†Standard errors are in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%,
* 10%; all local 
public finance variables are measured as the natural log of real per capita GHC (10,000s). 17 
The first two columns estimate this relationship using ordinary least squares, and the next two 
account for district unobserved effects in a random-effects model. In each case, the results regressing the 
most recent year’s (2004’s) logged per capita own revenues on district characteristics are contrasted with 
an equivalent measure of own revenues for the mean of the most recent three years (2002–2004), in order 
to smooth out possible year-on-year instabilities in revenue collection. 
Poorer districts tend to generate lower per capita own revenues, as is seen in the significant 
results across both ways of measuring own revenue and across both estimation methods. This is not 
particularly surprising, as the income base for taxation is likely lower in districts with a greater share of 
residents in poverty. Similarly intuitively, more urbanized districts have greater per capita own revenues. 
With businesses being an important source of revenue for local governments, through license fees and 
other fees levied on enterprises, more urbanized districts with their greater prevalence of businesses offer 
more opportunities for local revenue generation.  
The size of the district appears to consistently play a significant role as well, with larger districts 
generating lower per capita revenues. Both (relative to district size) fixed size of local governments—the 
number of civil servants, physical capacity of local administration—and the fact that an important share 
of internally generated revenues derive from sources not associated with taxable income (see Figure 3) 
are likely to play a role here. It is also of note that, after controlling for this range of factors that are 
known to vary strongly by region, region effects still play a significant role in explaining the magnitude of 
districts’ internal revenues. 
Tables 5a and 5b present the results of model (1), including the local finance variables, with the 
Hausman-Taylor estimation in Table 5a giving the primary results. The fixed-effects estimation results in 
Table 5b naturally do not identify the variables used in this model as time-invariant. The results are 
estimated (in the case of random effects and ordinary least squares) both with and without the control 
variables, to examine the robustness of the core results to the exclusion of these controls.  
The primary results show that with the public financial variables accounted for, fewer of the 
district characteristics emerge as significantly affecting own-revenue size, notably, the degree of 
urbanization of a district and the poverty rate in the district. Overall, the coefficients are quite robust 
across the estimation methods, and robust to the exclusion of the control variables. But now we see more 
differentiation between the models with the dependent variable specified as a year’s value versus the 
three-year moving averages. Tables 5a and 5b exploit the time series structure of the data, unlike Table 4, 
which presents essentially cross-section results (with the random-effects estimation making use of the 
time dimension only to control for unobservable district effects). Thus, it is not surprising that the 
difference in results in the case of the two regressions reflecting the two measures of own-revenue size is 
more salient here than in the case of the estimation in Table 4. 
The results suggest quite consistently across the various estimation methods, which reflect 
different empirical assumptions, that external grants and transfers taken as a whole do not appear to lead 
to greater internal revenue generation. On the contrary, especially when considering how transfers in one 
year affect the subsequent year’s own revenues—as opposed to the average of the subsequent three years’ 
own revenues—we see statistically significant evidence of a negative relationship: Transfers appear to 
discourage rather than encourage internal revenue generation.  
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    Random effects
 
Dependent variable:  Single-year
  3-year average
    Single-year.
  3-year average.
 
sh. urban  0.1972   0.2669 
**    0.213    
  0.2818 
**   
 
  (0.1327)    (0.1325) 
     (0.1309)    
  (0.1331) 
   
 
pop. density  -0.0304   -0.0152      -0.0197    
  -0.0056     
 
  (0.0329)    (0.0324) 
     (0.0301)    
  (0.0304) 
   
 
pop. size  -0.008   -0.0359      0.0054    
  -0.0263     
 
  (0.0528)    (0.052) 
     (0.0504)    
  (0.0509) 
   
 
poverty  -1.1004 
***  -1.056 
***    -1.041 
***   
  -1.0036 
***   
 
  (0.2602)    (0.2569) 
     (0.2552)    
  (0.2569) 
   
 
rain  -0.1409   -0.0468      0.2021    
  0.2544     
 
  (0.4249)    (0.4054) 
     (0.2413)    
  (0.2468) 
   
 
no road   -0.1821   -0.1629      -0.2094    
  -0.1838     
 
  (0.1589)    (0.1585) 
     (0.1553)    
  (0.158) 
   
 
literacy  0.4746   0.5293      0.367    
  0.441     
 
  (0.4179)    (0.4114) 
     (0.3906)    
  (0.3953) 
   
 
Christian  -0.3624   -0.3493      -0.3748    
  -0.3624     
 
  (0.2686)    (0.2651) 
     (0.2659)    
  (0.2673) 
   
 
ethn. Akan  -0.0224   -0.0292      -0.0717    
  -0.0717     
 
  (0.1616)    (0.1609) 
     (0.1542)    
  (0.1573) 
   
 
ethn. Ewe  0.1418   0.1094      0.2315    
  0.1873     
 
  (0.2215)    (0.2199) 
     (0.1981)    
  (0.2027) 
   
 
EXTit-1  -0.0245 
*  -0.0114      -0.0255 
**  -0.0286 
**  -0.0117    -0.014  
  (0.0127)    (0.0098) 
     (0.0125)    (0.0126)    (0.0097) 
   (0.0099)   
Personnel-Eit-1  0.1124 
***  0.0323 
**    0.1135 
***  0.1271 
***  0.0328 
**  0.0387 
** 
  (0.0226)    (0.0159) 
     (0.0226)    (0.0228)    (0.0159) 
   (0.0162)   
Recurrent-Eit-1  0.4727 
***  0.4793 
***    0.4759 
***  0.5176 
***  0.4797 
***  0.5102 
*** 
  (0.0321)    (0.0245) 
     (0.0318)    (0.0314)    (0.0245) 
   (0.0245)   
Capital-Eit-1  0.0293 
**  0.0339 
***    0.0308 
**  0.0248 
*  0.0349 
***  0.0298 
*** 
  (0.0128)    (0.0109) 
     (0.0127)    (0.0128)    (0.0108) 
   (0.0109)   
Western R.  0.5665 
***  0.5433 
***    0.5247 
***  0.8335 
***  0.5068 
***  0.8744 
*** 
  (0.1885)    (0.185) 
     (0.1775)    (0.089)    (0.1784) 
   (0.088)   
Central R.  0.23   0.2564      0.2397   0.4043 
***  0.2641    0.509 
*** 
  (0.1662)    (0.1639) 
     (0.1644)    (0.0865)    (0.1652) 
   (0.0855)   
Greater Accra R.  0.6544 
***  0.6996 
***    0.7404 
***  1.1694 
***  0.7765 
***  1.2742 
*** 
  (0.2007)    (0.1971) 
     (0.1835)    (0.1191)    (0.1846) 
   (0.1157)   
Volta R.  0.211   0.2333      0.1757   0.4834 
***  0.2021    0.5407 
*** 
  (0.1681)    (0.1673) 
     (0.161)    (0.0857)    (0.1638) 
   (0.085)   
Eastern R.  0.2791 
*  0.2617      0.2561   0.5436 
***  0.2409    0.6042 
*** 
  (0.163)    (0.1607) 
     (0.1573)    (0.0823)    (0.1584) 
   (0.0811)   
Ashanti R.  0.4021 
**  0.3917 
**    0.4075 
***  0.6755 
***  0.3965 
**  0.7357 
*** 
  (0.1576)    (0.1554) 
     (0.1558)    (0.0796)    (0.1565) 
   (0.0782)   
Brong Ahafo R.  0.3489 
**  0.4031 
***    0.3946 
***  0.5513 
***  0.4429 
***  0.6562 
*** 
  (0.1563)    (0.1528) 
     (0.1509)    (0.0865)    (0.1505) 
   (0.0846)   
Upper East R.  0.626 
***  0.6836 
***    0.6703 
***  0.5536 
***  0.7226 
***  0.6302 
*** 
  (0.1207)    (0.119) 
     (0.1124)    (0.1042)    (0.1134) 
   (0.1043)   
Upper West R.  0.6465 
***  0.6482 
***    0.6846 
***  0.5035 
***  0.6806 
***  0.52 
*** 
  (0.1291)    (0.1262) 
     (0.122)    (0.1115)    (0.1219) 
   (0.1114)   
Constant  4.6693   4.3607      2.1088   2.4508 
***  2.1386    2.9145 
*** 
  (3.134) 
   (2.9728) 
     (1.741) 
   (0.223) 
   (1.778) 
   (0.1862) 
  
Number of observations  1,028 
  951 
    1,028 
  1,028 
  951 
  951 
 
Sargan-Hansen (χ
2):  19.56 
***   
Breusch-
Pagan (χ
2):  42.25 
***  101.31 
***  253.77 
***  390.51 
*** 
Notes: 
†Standard errors are in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%,
* 10%; all local public finance variables are 
measured as the natural log of real per capita GHC (10,000s). 19 
Table 5b. External grants and level of internally generated funds, fixed-effects and pooled ordinary 
least squares estimation
† 
  Fixed effects
      Pooled ordinary least squares
 
Dependent variable:  Single-year
  3-year average
      Single-year.
  3-year average
 
sh. urban   
   
    0.1995 
**      0.2636 
***     
   
   
    (0.0923)       (0.0722)      
pop. density   
   
    -0.0228       -0.0125      
   
   
    (0.0214)       (0.0167)      
pop. size   
   
    0.0225       0.0001      
   
   
    (0.0364)       (0.0291)      
poverty   
   
    -0.9752 
***      -0.8816 
***     
   
   
    (0.1825)       (0.1433)      
rain   
   
    0.1881       0.233 
*     
   
   
    (0.1683)       (0.1325)      
no road    
   
    -0.1989 
*      -0.177 
**     
   
   
    (0.1091)       (0.0852)      
literacy   
   
    0.3305       0.4037 
*     
   
   
    (0.2763)       (0.2148)      
Christian   
   
    -0.3356 
*      -0.3131 
**     
   
   
    (0.1901)       (0.1461)      
ethn. Akan   
   
    -0.0605       -0.0634      
   
   
    (0.1077)       (0.0844)      
ethn. Ewe   
   
    0.2187       0.1683      
   
   
    (0.138)       (0.1087)      
EXTit-1  -0.0243 
*  -0.0106      -0.027 
**  -0.0354 
***  -0.0153   -0.0264 
** 
  (0.0126)    (0.0098) 
     (0.013)    (0.0134)    (0.0111)    (0.0117)   
Personnel-Eit-1  0.1191 
***  0.0337 
**    0.1076 
***  0.1309 
***  0.0308 
*  0.05 
*** 
  (0.0238)    (0.0162) 
     (0.0223)    (0.0227)    (0.017)    (0.0181)   
Recurrent-Eit-1  0.4128 
***  0.4476 
***    0.5341 
***  0.6175 
***  0.561 
***  0.6583 
*** 
  (0.0349)    (0.0256) 
     (0.0304)    (0.0295)    (0.0246)    (0.0246)   
Capital-Eit-1  0.0272 
**  0.033 
***    0.0349 
***  0.0224 
*  0.0411 
***  0.019  
  (0.0129)    (0.0109) 
     (0.0132)    (0.0135)    (0.0122)    (0.0126)   
Western R.              0.4947 
***  0.7545 
***  0.4818 
***  0.7596 
*** 
        
     (0.1267)    (0.0627)    (0.0975)    (0.0498)   
Central R.              0.2172 
*  0.3373 
***  0.2493 
***  0.4153 
*** 
        
     (0.1176)    (0.0607)    (0.0902)    (0.0478)   
Greater Accra R.              0.6917 
***  1.0218 
***  0.7168 
***  1.054 
*** 
        
     (0.1314)    (0.0864)    (0.1013)    (0.0686)   
Volta R.              0.1746   0.4319 
***  0.207 
**  0.469 
*** 
        
     (0.1131)    (0.0598)    (0.0883)    (0.0471)   
Eastern R.              0.2407 
**  0.4753 
***  0.2353 
***  0.5084 
*** 
        
     (0.1123)    (0.0581)    (0.0866)    (0.0457)   
Ashanti R.              0.3878 
***  0.6047 
***  0.3862 
***  0.6356 
*** 
        
     (0.1115)    (0.0567)    (0.0857)    (0.0445)   
Brong Ahafo R.              0.3566 
***  0.4647 
***  0.4029 
***  0.5323 
*** 
        
     (0.1091)    (0.0617)    (0.0831)    (0.0484)   
Upper East R.              0.6398 
***  0.4964 
***  0.6839 
***  0.5512 
*** 
        
     (0.0802)    (0.0714)    (0.0621)    (0.0568)   
Upper West R.              0.6567 
***  0.4567 
***  0.6375 
***  0.4591 
*** 
        
     (0.0887)    (0.077)    (0.0681)    (0.0614)   
Constant  3.7703 
***  3.9582 
***    1.7115   1.8324 
***  1.5334   2.043 
*** 
  (0.2605) 
   (0.1962) 
     (1.2235) 
   (0.2029) 
   (0.9733) 
   (0.1784) 
  
No. of observations  1,028 
  951 
    1,028 
  1,028 
  951 
  951 
 
F-stat:  62.25 
***  107.60 
*** 
  0.64 
  0.61 
  0.76 
  0.72 
 
Notes: 
†Standard errors are in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%,
* 10%; all local public finance variables are 
measured as the natural log of real per capita GHC (10,000s).20 
The magnitude of the negative effect is, however, quite small: A 10 percent increase in external 
transfers to local governments is associated with an approximately one-quarter of a percent drop in own-
revenue generation. Not only the broad direction, but also the magnitude of effects, emerges as quite 
robust across results from different estimation methods. When considering the smoothed measure of own 
revenues, the effect is less than half that and is for the most part not statistically significant.  
The results also show that, in contrast to the effect of external grants, greater past public 
expenditures incurred by local governments in any category (personnel, nonpersonnel recurrent, or capital 
spending) are significantly associated with greater subsequent local revenue generation. However, the 
extent to which greater expenditures result in more own-revenue generation differs importantly by 
expenditure type. The response of own revenues with respect to past spending is very low in the case of 
capital expenditures. A 10 percent increase in the latter is associated with an approximately one-third of a 
percent increase in subsequent own revenues. The response is about three times larger for personnel 
spending, and the largest response is to nonpersonnel recurrent spending, in which a 10 percent increase is 
associated with a 4.7 percent increase in local revenues in the subsequent year.  
This strong response differentiation by spending category is not surprising, and is in fact quite 
consistent with the way that revenue sources are linked to expenditure types. As discussed in Section 2, 
local governments undertake capital investments primarily using the DACF, donor grants, and other 
external transfers, rather than through IGF. The latter are mostly used for maintenance, operational, and to 
some extent personnel expenditures. Thus, higher past expenditures in these categories are more likely to 
invoke greater local revenue mobilization than are increases in past capital expenditures. 
IGF Growth and Dynamics 
The analysis thus far has considered the financial and nonfinancial factors that may influence the 
magnitude of per capita internal revenue funds generated by local governments. For the technical as well 
as substantive reasons discussed earlier, in light of our central interest in the way intergovernmental and 
other external transfers to local governments may influence their incentive to generate local revenues, it is 
useful to examine as well how financial factors affect the growth, or changes, in IGF. The results of this 
set of estimations are presented in Table 6. 
In further seeking to control for the budget-size effect, which may intrude on consistent 
estimation of the influence of the variables of interest on IGF, we include here among the covariates also 
past IGF: In addition to using changes in rather than levels of IGF as the dependent variable, controlling 
for past IGF further reduces the possibility that any positive effects of past expenditures on IGF are a 
result of (upward) bias due to simultaneity.  
Table 6 presents different specifications in terms of levels and/or changes in the lagged 
covariates, and checks the robustness of the core findings to variations in the estimation method. In the 
presence of lagged values of (the growth of) own revenue, the primary estimation results are derived from 
the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimation methods, and are presented in the top panel of Table 6. 
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    Arellano-Bond
 
Δ IGFit-1  -0.0944 
*  -0.158 
***  -0.626 
*** 
  0.0267   -0.0893 
**  -0.238 
*** 
   (0.055)    (0.0465)    (0.044)   




Δ EXTit-1  -0.0023   -0.0304 
**  -0.0312 
** 
  -0.0065   -0.0353 
**  -0.0679 
** 
   (0.0221
 
  (0.0151)    (0.0128)   




Δ Recurrent-Eit-1  0.0008   0.1284 
**  0.2347 
*** 
  -0.0173   0.1585 
***  -0.0679   
   (0.0745
 
  (0.0544)    (0.0606)   




Δ Personnel-Eit-1  -0.0141   0.0373   0.0668  
  -0.0414   0.0326   0.1445   
   (0.0426
 
  (0.0425)    (0.054)   
  (0.0403)   (0.0409
 
  (0.112) 
  
Δ Capital-Eit-1  0.031   0.014   0.0121  
  0.0388 
*  0.0204   -0.0217   
   (0.0245
 
  (0.015)    (0.0149)   




IGFit-1  -0.6454 
***  -0.4253 
***    
  -0.9367 
***  -0.6235 
***   
  
   (0.0767
 
  (0.0582)      




EXTit-1  -0.0441   -0.0026      
  -0.0295   0.0152    
  
   (0.0386
 
  (0.0296)      




Recurrent-Eit-1  0.3515 
***           0.3468 
***       
  
   (0.0823
 
           (0.0873)        
  
Personnel-Eit-1  0.1349 
***        
  0.1897 
***       
  
   (0.0373
 
           (0.0409)        
  
Capital-Eit-1  -0.0446             -0.0381        
  
   (0.0333
 
           (0.0281)        
  
Constant  2.2253 
***  3.3564 
***  0.0671 
*** 
  3.8938 
***  4.7142 




   (0.474) 
   (0.0141) 
  
  (0.5289) 
  (0.5316
 
  (0.0189) 
  
AB Test, order 1:  -6.74 
***  -6.65 
***  -6.11 
*** 
  -6.29 
***  -6.65 
***  -5.87 
*** 
2:  0.05   0.5   -4.73 
*** 
  1.3   0.5   -1.09  
  Fixed Effects 
  Pooled Ordinary Least Squares
 
Δ IGFit-1  0.0356   -0.0686   -0.4025 
*** 
  -0.2038 
***  -0.2929 
***  -0.3823 
*** 
   (0.0478
 
  (0.0418)    (0.0458) 
  
  (0.0367)   (0.034)    (0.033) 
  
Δ EXTit-1  -0.0076   -0.042 
***  -0.0291 
** 
  -0.0115   -0.0333 
**  -0.0318 
*** 
   (0.0194
 
  (0.0149)    (0.0134) 
  




Δ Recurrent-Eit-1  -0.0146   0.173 
***  0.1852 
*** 
  0.059   0.1907 
***  0.1914 
*** 
   (0.0608
 
  (0.0504)    (0.0604) 
  




Δ Personnel-Eit-1  -0.0186   0.045   0.0509   
  0.0119   0.0419   0.0442   
   (0.0379
 
  (0.0368)    (0.0451) 
  




Δ Capital-Eit-1  0.0301   0.0194   0.0054   
  0.0209   0.0081   0.0063   
   (0.0193
 
  (0.0142)    (0.0165) 
  




IGFit-1  -0.9163 
***  -0.6433 
***  
     -0.3863 
***  -0.1765 
***   
  
   (0.0603
 
  (0.0502)    




EXTit-1  -0.0226   0.0275    
  
  -0.0301   0.0027    
  
   (0.0312
 
  (0.0254)    
  




Recurrent-Eit-1  0.3523 
***      
  
  0.2539 
***       
  
   (0.0736
 
      
  
  (0.0511)        
  
Personnel-Eit-1  0.1526 
***      
  
  0.0756 
***       
  
   (0.0343
 
      
  
  (0.0258)       
  
Capital-Eit-1  -0.0248        
  
  -0.0318        
  
   (0.0233
 
      
  
  (0.0205)       
  
Constant  3.7902 
***  4.7518 
***  0.0642 
*** 
  1.1558 
***  1.3958 




   (0.4375) 
   (0.0081) 
  
  (0.2455) 
   (0.2367
 
  (0.0151) 
  
F-stat  46.98 
***  45.26 
***  20.75 
***    26.91 
***  30.63 
***  28.94 
*** 
Adj. R
2   
   
   
    0.23   0.19   0.14  
Notes: 
Number of observations: 889. 
†Standard errors are in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%,
* 10%; all local 
public finance variables are measured as the natural log of real per capita GHC (10,000s). 22 
Column A presents the primary results, in which the potential effect on IGF growth of both levels 
of and adjustments to the public financial variables are accounted for. These results show no evidence that 
either higher levels or higher adjustments of external grants spur own-revenue growth in Ghana. If 
anything, the effect points (albeit only tenuously) in the other direction. Consistently with our findings in 
the level equation, the more pronounced drivers of IGF growth are past increases in public spending on 
nonpersonnel recurrent spending and, to a somewhat lesser extent, salary expenditures. This suggests that 
our earlier caveat on the potentially misleading reasons why we see a positive coefficient on local 
expenditures may have been relatively conservative. And, as before, capital spending increases have a 
weakly negative effect on locally generated revenue growth. Finally, there is also evidence of 
convergence in local governments’ internally generated revenues. Higher-IGF districts expand their IGF 
significantly more slowly.  
Also on a methodological note, the results suggest that the Blundell-Bond estimation in the case 
of this empirical analysis is an improvement over the Arellano-Bond method, confirming the choice of the 
former as the primary results. Blundell and Bond (1998) show in Monte Carlo simulation that when the 
true parameter value of the lagged dependent variable is relatively large, the number of time periods in the 
panel moderate, and the number of panels not too large, the system-generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimator can reduce both finite sample bias that would obtain in the difference-GMM 
estimation, as well as improve on the precision of the estimator. While in our empirical case the key 
elements do not raise large concerns about the difference-GMM estimator—the (absolute) value of the 
lagged dependent variable is not close to 1 and the number of time series is not very small—still the 
evidence from the Blundell and Bond simulation shows that the system-GMM estimator offers better 
consistency and variance properties, with these improvements simply being smaller in such a scenario. 
Indeed, we find in Table 6 that the absolute value of the lagged dependent variable coefficient estimate is 
large in the system-GMM estimation across all specifications, and its statistical significance higher. 
Columns B and C present alternate specifications, which show to what extent these results are 
affected by the exclusion of the level variables not of central interest (B) and the inclusion of only the 
change variables (C). The main effect of these changes to variable specification is to sharpen evidence on 
the adverse effect of external funds on IGF, showing now that acceleration in the growth of external 
transfers leads to statistically significant decelerated IGF growth.  
Effect of External Grants Disaggregated by the Two Time Ranges 
As seen in Figure 1, the time trend of external grants displays two rather distinct periods: Aggregate 
external grants to local government fluctuate from 1994 until 2001, without any discernable upward or 
downward trend. But after 2001, this revenue source for local governments sees a steady increase. This 
may reflect a change in the policy focus of the new incoming government at around that time with regard 
to resource allocation to local governments. Ghana was ruled by the National Democratic Council (NDC) 
from 1992 to 2000, and then by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) until after the end of the study period. 
While it is difficult to establish with certainty whether a shift in policy focus effected by a change 
in party rule is responsible for the change in the time pattern of external grants, this pattern warrants an 
econometric investigation of the effect of external grants on own-revenue generation separately for the 
two time ranges. Tables 7 and 8 present these results, examining the determinants of the level and the 
growth of IGF, respectively. While these regressions mirror those in Tables 5 (single-year regressions) 
and 6, respectively, for Table 7 only the coefficients on the public financial variables are displayed to 
economize on space.  
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Pooled ordinary least 
squares 
  [1]    [1]  [2]    [1]  [1]  [2] 
Pre-2001                             
EXTit-1  0.0145     0.0068   0.0035     0.0095   0.0024   -0.0074  
  (0.0182)      (0.0176)    (0.0178)      (0.018) 
   (0.0184)     (0.0188) 
  
Personnel-Eit-1  -0.0408      -0.0285    -0.0047      -0.0563 
*  -0.009   0.028  
  (0.0308) 
     (0.0301) 
   (0.0303) 
    (0.0335) 
   (0.0295)     (0.0295) 
  
Recurrent-Eit-1  0.4702 
***    0.5056 
***  0.5485 
***    0.3663 
***  0.583 
***  0.6439 
*** 
  (0.0459)      (0.0441)    (0.0429)     (0.0526)    (0.0415) 
  (0.0396)   
Capital-Eit-1  0.0044     0.0144   0.0115     0.009   0.0193   0.0146  
  (0.0177)      (0.0173)    (0.0174)     (0.0178)    (0.018)    (0.0184)   
Sargan-H. (χ
2):  20.53 
***     
   
 
   
  0.62
    0.59
  
Breusch-P. (χ
2):   
    28.85 
***  46.66 
***  F-stat:  12.31 
***     44.0  
***  68.34 
*** 
Post-2001   
     
   
               
EXTit-1  -0.0567 
***    -0.0528 
***  -0.0577 
***    -0.0498 
***  -0.0516 
***  -0.058 
*** 
  (0.0192)      (0.0183)    (0.019)     (0.0191)    (0.0195)    (0.0211)   
Personnel-Eit-1  0.1387 
***    0.1488 
***  0.1826 
***    0.113 
*  0.16 
***  0.2021 
*** 
  (0.0539)      (0.0532)    (0.0539)     (0.0624)    (0.0531)    (0.0538)   
Recurrent-Eit-1  0.272 
***    0.3039 
***  0.3844 
***    0.1155 
*  0.3794 
***  0.5065 
*** 
  (0.0574)      (0.0557)    (0.0562)     (0.0689)    (0.0545)    (0.0544)   
Capital-Eit-1  0.0361 
*    0.0333 
*  0.0171     0.0432 
**  0.028   -0.0001  
  (0.0198)      (0.0199)    (0.0205)     (0.0209)    (0.0211)    (0.0223)   
Sargan-H. (χ
2):  —
     
   
 
   
  0.66
    0.60
  
Breusch-P. (χ
2):   
    7.77 
***  17.51 
***  F-stat:  5.04 
***  28.43 
***  37.90 
*** 
Notes: 
District socioeconomic characteristics [1] included; [2] not included.  
Number of observations: 598 pre-2001; 322 post-2001.




* 10%; all local public finance variables are measured as the natural log of real per capita GHC (10,000s). 
A picture that is consistent across the estimation methods, specifications, and measures of IGF 
emerges: The core result—namely, that rather than encouraging own-revenue generation, external 
financial flows to local governments seem to follow a pattern that ultimately discourages own-revenue 
generation—is strongly driven by the financial patterns in the latter years of the 11-year period, during 
which external grants steadily and rapidly increased. Across all the regressions represented in Tables 7 
and 8, the effect of external grants is nonsignificant and very small in magnitude prior to 2001, whereas 
statistical significance of this effect is established post-2001, and the coefficient estimates are clearly 
higher (in absolute value) than—in the primary estimations and specifications, nearly double—the 
estimates in the regression over the full time range. A comparison of these results with the estimation over 
the full time range suggests that the latter are importantly driven by effects in the post-2001 years, 
although the results for the period prior to 2001 do not run directly counter to the basic finding that 
external grants do not work to encourage greater own-revenue generation by local governments. 24 
Table 8. External grants and growth of internally generated funds, time-disaggregated regressions
† 
  Pre-2001
    Post-2001
 
  Blundell-Bond  Arellano-Bond    Blundell-Bond  Arellano-Bond 
Δ IGFit-1  -0.026    -0.0765    0.0844    -0.0039      -0.1632 
*  -0.1624 
*  0.2409 
   -0.0221 
  
   (0.0587)   (0.0558)    (0.059)   (0.0545)     (0.0922) 
  (0.0906) 
  (0.1779) 
  (0.1711) 
 
Δ EXTit-1  0.0107   0.0047   0.0173   0.0169     -0.1311 
*  -0.1135 
  -0.092 
  -0.1401 
*** 
   (0.0236)   (0.0193)    (0.0248)   (0.0185)     (0.0696) 
  (0.0714) 
  (0.0615) 
  (0.0534) 
 
Δ Recurrent-Eit-1  -0.0431   0.0836   -0.0377   0.114 
**    -0.2586 
*  -0.1345 
  -0.2031 
*  -0.0969 
 
   (0.0669)   (0.0545)    (0.0704)   (0.0505)     (0.1408) 
  (0.0983) 
  (0.1148) 
  (0.0886) 
 
Δ Personnel-Eit-1  0.0748   0.094 
***  0.0971 
*  0.1045 
***    0.1593 
  0.115 
  0.0966 
  0.0558 
 
   (0.0471)   (0.0366)    (0.0497)   (0.0352)     (0.1357) 
  (0.0777) 
  (0.0894) 
  (0.0374) 
 
Δ Capital-Eit-1  0.0371   0.0249   0.0374   0.0223     -0.0036 
  -0.0204 
  -0.0229 
  -0.0256 
 
   (0.0257) 
  (0.0224) 
   (0.0256) 
  (0.0203) 
    (0.0372) 
   (0.0234) 
   (0.0264) 
   (0.0229) 
  
IGFit-1  -0.681 
***  -0.5075 
***  -0.9687 
***  -0.7136 
***    -0.5712 
***  -0.4194 
**  -1.7009 
***  -0.922 
* 
   (0.1028)   (0.0931)    (0.1291)   (0.0942)      (0.219) 
  (0.2136) 
  (0.4588) 
  (0.4741) 
 
EXTit-1  -0.0264   -0.0205   -0.0331   -0.0399     0.0892 
  0.0786 
  0.0536 
  0.1645 
* 
   (0.039)   (0.0309)    (0.0518)   (0.0391)     (0.0795) 
  (0.0813) 
 (0.1064) 
  (0.0982) 
 
Recurrent-Eit-1  0.4546 
***      0.4178 
**        0.752 
***   
  0.2125 
   
 
   (0.12)       (0.1638)        (0.2011) 
   
 (0.2398) 
   
 
Personnel-Eit-1  -0.0055       0.0083         -0.161 
   
  -0.1489 
   
 
   (0.0607)        (0.0757)         (0.2586) 
   
 (0.2875) 
   
 
Capital-Eit-1  -0.0529       -0.0494         -0.1228 
   
  0.1941 
   
 
   (0.0331)        (0.0451)          (0.086) 
   
  (0.145) 
   
 
Constant  2.6217 
***  4.0514 
***  5.0162 
***  5.8015 
***    0.5779 
  2.7287 
 10.7701 
***  5.8783 
* 
  (0.7211) 
  (0.7789) 
   (0.8015) 
  (0.8025) 
    (1.5079) 
   (1.664) 
  (3.3903) 
   (3.1516) 
  
AB Test, order 1:  -4.14 
***  -3.89 
***  -3.64 
***  -3.64 
***    ___  ___  ___  ___ 
2:  0.21   0.18   1.57   1.17    
Notes: 
†The number of years in the second time frame is too low to calculate the Arellano-Bond test statistics.




* 10%; all local public finance variables are measured as the natural log of real per capita GHC (10,000s). 
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6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main motivation for decentralization, namely, that subnational governments are better placed to 
allocate public resources more efficiently and effectively, is often supported by the argument that 
subnational governments have better information about the needs for and requirements of public services 
in their jurisdictions. This argument in favor of decentralization rests strongly on the assumption that 
local governments have a substantial degree of fiscal autonomy and are able to use local discretion in 
resource allocation. However, the fiscal responsibilities of local governments often remain quite 
circumscribed, and their budgets are often dominated by external transfers that are usually tied to specific 
investments that may not match the priorities of local governments. Therefore, local governments’ fiscal 
autonomy is intimately tied to their IGF. 
Using 1994–2004 panel data on all 110
5
We find that greater past external transfers are significantly and negatively associated with local 
governments’ levels of IGF: District governments with higher externally generated revenues tend to have 
significantly lower levels, as well as experience slower subsequent growth in, internally generated 
revenues. (However, while the negative sign in the latter relationship is consistently present across 
estimation methods and specifications, the effects of transfers on the growth of IGF are statistically not as 
strong as the level effect.) Therefore, the nature of the flow of local governments’ external sources of 
revenue appears to discourage rather than encourage their internal revenue generation. The analysis 
suggests that this result is strongly driven by intergovernmental transfer patterns, especially in the latter 
years (from 2001 onward) of the time period under study.  
 district governments’ public finances (revenues from 
different sources and different types of public expenditures) and other district-level data, this paper 
examined the impact of the flow and size of externally generated revenues (from central government and 
donors) on local governments’ own-generated revenues, or IGF—an issue that has become a critical 
policy concern in Ghana.  
The results also show that greater past public expenditures by local governments are significantly 
associated with greater subsequent local revenue generation, but this effect is strongly differentiated by 
expenditure type. The response of own revenues with respect to past spending is very low in the case of 
capital expenditures, is substantially larger for personnel spending, and is by far the largest with respect to 
nonpersonnel recurrent spending. This strong response differentiation by spending category is quite 
consistent with the way that revenue sources are linked to expenditure types: Local governments 
undertake capital investments primarily using external transfers, while internally generated revenues are 
mostly used for maintenance, operational, and, to a lesser extent, personnel expenditures. Thus, higher 
past expenditures in these categories are more likely to invoke greater local revenue mobilization than are 
increases in past capital expenditures. 
Assuming that subnational governments are better placed to allocate public resources more 
efficiently and effectively, local governments’ lack of fiscal autonomy compromises Ghana’s 
development agenda in using public expenditures for promoting growth and equitable distribution. 
Increasing the discretionary component of transfers to local governments would be one way of increasing 
their fiscal autonomy. Involving local governments in all stages of program and project design, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation would help match the priorities of external funders with 
local priorities. The crowding out of IGF by grants may also reflect the relative absence of accountability 
associated with grants compared to IGF. Thus, making local governments accountable to their 
jurisdictions for all sources of revenue will be important, as decentralization is fundamentally about 
making governance at the local level more responsive to the felt needs of the large majority of 
the population. 
                                                       
5 This refers to the number of districts existing during the period under study. 26 
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Table A.1. District per capita expenditures and revenues (average by region, real GHC) 
Year 
Expenditure    Revenue    Expenditure    Revenue 
Capital  Personnel  Nonpers. 





  Capital  Personnel  Nonpers. 





  Ashanti            Northern         
1994  0.1690  0.1266  0.1874    0.2944  0.2949    0.0824  0.0771  0.0804    0.1657  0.0792 
1995  0.9771  0.1175  0.1611    1.0159  0.2598    0.5001  5.1554  0.0880    0.6189  0.0730 
1996  0.9907  0.1308  0.2732    1.0856  0.2739    1.0672  0.1077  0.1066    1.0434  0.1546 
1997  0.8964  0.1362  0.1577    0.9700  0.2608    0.7264  0.0932  0.0792    0.8420  0.0715 
1998  3.3735  0.1798  0.1819    1.3735  0.3024    0.8252  0.1178  0.0878    1.2723  0.0715 
1999  1.0475  0.2108  0.1734    1.0047  0.2394    0.9138  0.1271  0.1015    1.1402  0.0693 
2000  0.9951  0.2361  0.1745    1.1043  0.2551    1.1720  0.1487  0.0945    1.2551  0.0867 
2001  0.5896  0.2535  0.1688    0.8914  0.2538    2.4633  0.1620  0.1196    1.2234  0.1004 
2002  1.1760  0.2849  0.2208    1.3681  0.3643    1.2836  0.1988  0.1096    1.3424  0.1910 
2003  2.0834  0.3098  0.2400    2.2772  0.3412    2.5997  0.2122  0.1390    3.3762  0.1598 
2004  3.6305  0.3362  0.2747    3.8083  0.4443    2.9905  0.2405  0.1101    4.4170  0.1130 
  Brong Ahafo            Upper East         
1994  0.1764  0.1375  0.2030    0.2215  0.3305    0.3513  0.1065  0.1542    0.4554  0.1899 
1995  0.9694  0.0992  0.1838    1.1223  0.2801    1.3873  0.0899  0.1234    1.5369  0.1858 
1996  1.2465  0.1700  0.1998    0.8788  0.3055    1.3245  0.1381  0.1430    1.1845  0.2529 
1997  0.8892  0.2414  0.1770    1.0655  0.2477    1.0631  0.1842  0.1453    1.2391  0.2521 
1998  0.9478  0.3078  0.2330    1.4743  0.2418    1.3461  0.2220  0.1988    1.9157  0.2376 
1999  0.8992  0.3299  0.2221    1.0276  0.2719    1.0596  0.2346  0.1512    1.1710  0.1818 
2000  0.9068  0.3483  0.1966    1.1519  0.2654    1.2384  0.2994  0.1574    1.5244  0.1996 
2001  0.7049  0.3829  0.1944    0.9652  0.2619    0.7774  0.2512  0.1292    0.8669  0.3064 
2002  1.2416  0.3999  0.2949    1.4193  0.3680    1.3631  0.2899  0.1864    1.4665  0.2578 
2003  2.1648  0.4375  0.2567    1.9838  0.5611    3.1660  0.2002  0.2060    3.8501  0.2496 
2004  2.7835  0.4683  0.2465    3.1774  0.3505    4.7072  0.3158  0.1956    4.3894  0.3081 
  Central            Upper West         
1994  0.2552  0.1467  0.1997    0.3211  0.2357    0.1632  0.0768  0.0956    0.5733  0.1331 
1995  1.0134  0.1204  0.1772    1.1075  0.2292    1.2305  0.0644  0.1147    1.3086  0.1049 
1996  0.9916  0.1636  0.1623    1.0711  0.2599    1.1928  0.0923  0.1255    1.3762  0.1944 
1997  0.9591  0.1876  0.1477    1.1146  0.2233    1.2648  0.1811  0.1258    1.1466  0.1883 
1998  1.2189  0.2574  0.1745    1.7668  0.2143    1.3596  0.1402  0.1319    1.8922  0.1553 
1999  0.7765  0.2871  0.2000    1.0964  0.2300    1.4091  0.2320  0.1800    1.3669  0.1738 
2000  1.1817  0.3169  0.1670    1.4914  0.2238    1.3114  0.2314  0.1441    1.5387  0.2222 
2001  0.6660  0.3674  0.1968    1.2853  0.2355    1.7432  0.1826  0.1022    1.7335  0.1511 
2002  1.1508  0.3827  0.2257    1.4301  0.2886    2.5508  0.2924  0.1687    2.8738  0.2455 
2003  2.4745  0.3669  0.2139    3.2308  0.2510    4.2243  0.2834  0.1654    1.6792  0.2378 
2004  3.2944  0.4056  0.2363    3.5506  0.2974    6.9584  0.2759  0.2558    6.8348  0.3891 
  Eastern            Volta         
1994  0.1750  0.1266  0.1905    0.2969  0.2699    0.1793  0.0901  0.1590    0.2223  0.1940 
1995  1.2153  0.1059  0.1391    1.1283  0.2643    0.8463  0.0728  0.1105    0.9039  0.1853 
1996  0.8337  0.1186  0.1565    0.8989  0.2023    1.0967  0.1078  0.1186    1.0459  0.1797 
1997  0.7922  0.1545  0.1360    0.9069  0.2090    0.8053  0.1321  0.1114    0.9935  0.1656 
1998  1.0109  0.1707  0.1805    1.2012  0.2127    1.1483  0.1831  0.1428    1.4052  0.1762 
1999  0.8226  0.2500  0.1956    1.0518  0.2221    1.1591  0.2278  0.1588    1.1457  0.2153 
2000  0.8914  0.2870  0.1774    1.0812  0.2131    1.0583  0.2823  0.1685    1.2288  0.2331 
2001  0.8206  0.2827  0.1725    0.8662  0.2064    0.7911  0.2820  0.2108    1.1649  0.2290 
2002  0.9215  0.3049  0.2156    2.1792  0.3451    1.0887  0.3097  0.2120    1.3364  0.2618 
2003  1.8793  0.3347  0.2390    2.3638  0.3278    2.0425  0.3263  0.1863    2.3441  0.2427 
2004  2.3233  0.3744  0.3241    2.4341  0.3599    4.1048  0.3559  0.2102    4.1329  0.3005 
  Greater Accra            Western         
1994  0.2385  0.2499  0.3768    0.4366  0.7708    0.2161  0.1150  0.1682    0.4760  0.3298 
1995  1.1159  0.2308  0.3355    0.7363  0.7463    1.0127  0.1865  0.2306    1.0462  0.3958 
1996  1.1533  0.2868  0.3396    0.8604  0.6472    1.2866  0.2219  0.2298    1.1869  0.4400 
1997  0.9922  0.2610  0.3272    0.7735  0.6078    1.1435  0.2251  0.2027    1.2802  0.4342 
1998  1.2611  0.2373  0.3702    1.3457  0.6413    1.0448  0.1800  0.1710    1.1960  0.3255 
1999  1.1105  0.3464  0.5263    1.1932  0.8045    0.9320  0.1943  0.1685    0.9567  0.2760 
2000  1.1496  0.3799  0.5113    1.3414  0.8033    0.9616  0.2205  0.1801    0.9931  0.3085 
2001  0.6317  0.3586  0.4524    1.1211  0.7781    0.6142  0.2350  0.2058    0.5549  0.2943 
2002  0.9992  0.4488  0.6490    1.2598  0.7960    1.1022  0.2980  0.3041    1.1620  0.5150 
2003  1.5256  0.5586  0.7433    2.2263  1.0571    1.9002  0.3104  0.3415    2.2854  0.5927 29 
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